Party Capability versus Court Preference: Why Do the �Haves� Come Out Ahead?�An Empirical Lesson from the Taiwan Supreme Court

kong-pin chen ; kuo-chang huang ; chang-ching lin;

Using civil appeals data on Taiwan�s Supreme Court (TSC), this article revisits
the well-known question of whether the �haves� come out ahead in litigations.
We first show that the higher-status litigants indeed mobilized stronger legal
representation and obtained more victories than the lower-status litigants.
However, we submit that that the party capability theory cannot fully explain
the advantages the �haves� enjoyed over the �have-nots.� Further analysis
reveals that the TSC�s exercise of discretionary jurisdiction also played an important
role by strongly favoring the governmental litigants at the agenda-setting
stage. We argue that the TSC�s preference in this regard was induced by
the TSC judges� self-identification as part of government. In conclusion, our
empirical investigation shows that both party capability and court preference
contribute to influence the outcomes of appeals