Corruption and Ideology in Autocracies

hollyer, james r. ; wantchekon, leonard;

Corruption is usually depicted in one of two ways: as stemming from a lack of
government accountability, or from a lack of capacity. Neither depiction predicts
that the structure of institutions meant to control corruption should vary across
autocratic regimes. If corruption results from moral hazard between politicians
and citizens, then all unaccountable governments should eschew anticorruption
bodies. If rent-seeking stems from moral hazard between politicians and
bureaucrats, all governments should create anticorruption bodies. We offer an
explanation for why unaccountable governments vary in their willingness to
create anticorruption institutions. Autocrats create such bodies to deter ideologically
disaffected members of the populace from entering the bureaucracy.
Anticorruption institutions act as a commitment by the elite to restrict the
monetary benefits from bureaucratic office, thus ensuring that only zealous supporters
of the elite will pursue bureaucratic posts. We illustrate these arguments
with case studies of South Korea and Rwanda