The Legality of the European Union�s Special Incentive Arrangement

jayasinghe, vichithri;

Globalization has propelled a mass influx of trading, opportunities, wealth, and crossborder relations. But, it has also added distance to the seemingly endless gap between developed and developing nations. Amidst this economic disparity, trade preferences present a solution to alleviate developing country dissatisfaction by providing access to international markets. It finds legitimacy in the Enabling Clause, which departs from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade�s principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity, and ensures that special and differential treatment is accorded to respond positively to the �development, financial and trade needs� of developing countries. The focus of this article will be the European Union�s (EU) GSP� Scheme that assists the entry of vulnerable economies to the EU�s international market. Contravening the rule against reciprocity, EU Regulation 978/2012 mandates the fulfilment of specific conditions before the granting of concessions. These conditions have the effect of increasing the burdens and responsibilities of vulnerable economies. Despite the Regulation�s
apparent magnanimity, it is unilateral and fails to inquire into the real �development,
financial and trade needs� in developing economies. As a result, due to a lack of bargaining power, they find themselves compelled to fulfil EU obligations, which may
have little or no bearing to the real causes for concern. This article endeavours to
examine the legality of the GSP� conditions in light of the Enabling Clause.